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On the Basing-Point System: Reply
By BRUCE L. BENSON, MELVIN L. GREENHUT, AND GEORGE NORMAN*
David D. Haddock's (1990) contention is
really that the Jacques F. Thisse and Xavier
Vives (1988) and the Bruce L. Benson,
Melvin L. Greenhut, and George Norman
(1990) papers do not provide a collusive
model that yields base-point pricing (BPP).
He apparently believes his paper (1982) es-
tablished competitive BPP and suggests (in
1990) that the collusive model and hard
empirical work alone remain. However, no
collusive model is required since it has al-
ready been well demonstrated in the litera-
ture on plant location and spatial price the-
ory that firms at feasible distance locations
from a production center would accept BPP
only because they fear that to do otherwise
would subject them to retaliatory actions by
the larger, more powerful firms at the pro-
duction center. Moreover, the paper by
Thisse-Vives (1988, henceforth TV) and
Benson-Greenhut-Norman (1990, hence-
forth BGN) indicated sufficiently that other
systems would arise than Haddock's com-
petitive BPP, especially since the restrictive
conditions necessary for the latter militate
against its use. Haddock, in fact, appears to
accept these conditions in his references to
Arthur R. Burns' proposals (1936) of near-
base-point pricing (NBPP). Hard empirical
analysis would indeed be in order in deter-
mining the extent of NBPP, not competitive
BPP.
This paper responds to the above noted
issues in three main sections. Section I
briefly provides some historical data on the
collusive uses of BPP for any future re-
searcher who seeks empirically to uncover a
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true competitive BPP system. Most impor-
tantly from a theoretical standpoint, this
section also explains why cartels will employ
BPP notwithstanding the obvious and well-
known thesis that other more profitable
spatial pricing forms exist, ceteris paribus.
Section II of this paper then distinguishes
between profits and locational rents, in the
process indicating in partial contradiction to
Haddock (1990) that BPP does generate
such rents. Though we have already con-
tended that existing theory has demon-
strated the use of different competitive
forms of spatial pricing and locations under
profit-maximizing conditions than competi-
tive BPP, Section III of this paper provides
specific basis for this contention as well as
references. That same section discusses
NBPP. To save space, we shall let the analy-
sis on the subject of the TV (1988) and
BGN (1990) papers stand by themselves,
without repeat demonstrations or explana-
tions of their results.
I. What Is an Effective Cartel?
Haddock's references to weak or strong
cartels and apparent suggestion (1990) that
BPP would be used by weak cartels over-
simplifies the subject. A cartel arises if it is
able to cover the cost of organizing, and
then survives if it establishes a sufficiently
strong monitoring and enforcement (polic-
ing) system that is capable of limiting com-
petition (for example, price competition, en-
try) to an acceptable level. Cartel costs vary
with the characteristics of an industry (num-
ber of firms, geographic distribution of firms
and consumers, etc.). When firms and con-
sumers are geographically dispersed, orga-
nizational and policing costs tend to be high
and the ability of the cartel to limit compe-
tition is lessened.
We echo many others when we suggest
that BPP reduces policing costs for a geo-
graphically dispersed group. Haddock is not
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convinced by this argument. He contends
that cheating will be detected more readily
under f.o.b. pricing because prices (both
f.o.b. and basing-point) are not easily ob-
served. He proposes that effective monitor-
ing must therefore involve observations of
relative sales. He suggests that chiseling at a
distance from a boundary "will create
damning evidence" under f.o.b. pricing
(1990, p. 959). We would propose, however,
that prices are readily observed under many
real basing-point pricing arrangements. Is
Haddock suggesting that chiseling would not
have been easily detected on the part of one
or more of the eleven differentially located
firms that offered cement to the U.S. gov-
ernment at the identical delivered prices of
$3.286854 iAetna v. FTC, 1946)? Or what
of the ten sealed bids priced at $253,633.80
for reinforcing bars iNew York Times,
February 20,1939), or the 59 steel pipe bids
to the U.S. Navy Department, each for
$6,001.83 iAnnual Report of the Attomey
General, 1937, pp. 37-38)? Or, consider the
eight geographically dispersed cement com-
panies that submitted bids to the Illinois
Department of Highways for deliveries at
102 sites in 102 Illinois counties, every
bid for every delivery being identical in
price iCongressional Record, May 31, 1959,
p. 7961).
The reason that basing-point prices are
relatively easier to monitor is that they are
determined by a simple formula that is
known by every cartel member. For in-
stance, between January 1982 and Septem-
ber 1983 there were three regional bases for
the pricing of cement in England, and deliv-
ery increments were applied to every 5 miles
of road. These increments reflected haulage
rate charges computed from a particular
base point, not the point of origin of the
shipper; these rates varied over time from
16p to 56p per ton per 5 miles of road.
Prices certainly may not be readily observ-
able under an f.o.b. system, but cooperative
BPP makes them relatively more observ-
able, and therefore reduces monitoring
costs.
The fundamental feature of BPP that
Haddock overlooks is that the main conspir-
ators are typically localized at (near) the
base point(s), and other spatially dispersed
firms feel obliged to adhere completely to
the system. A chiseler must be punished if
caught, or there will be no effective deter-
rent to cheating. When chiseling under some
organized type of pricing system other than
BPP affects only a single firm located at a
distant site, the incentives and ability of the
cartel to retaliate and punish the transgres-
sor are quite weak. This is particularly the
case if the affected firm is small and not
part of the main group of powerful conspir-
ators. When chiseling impacts all cartel
members, including the largest and most
powerful, as would be the case under BPP,
the potential for and likelihood of retalia-
tion is much greater. This could conceivably
induce, in some countries, the procollu-
sive type of antitrust action mentioned by
Haddock; however, in a country such as the
United States of the late twentieth century,
any BPP cartel would be likely to pursue
more subtle means of punishing a chiseler.
We contend that even if monitoring costs
are no lower under a basing-point system
than they are under some undefined, orga-
nized f.o.b. type of arrangement, total BPP
cartel costs (which include enforcement as
well as monitoring costs) will tend to be
less. The imposition of credible punishment
is an important part and cost of effective
cartelization. For example, Clair Wilcox
(1960) mentioned 49,000 pages of testimony
along with 50,000 pages of exhibits on ce-
ment industry prices that were presented to
the Federal Trade Commission. After also
discussing the equally detailed documents
on record concerning the steel industry, he
went on to review penalties. Those imposed
by the respective cartels on member firms
that failed to adhere to the system were
strikingly severe (pp. 280-81). He con-
cluded that "If basing point pricing were a
spontaneous outgrowth of natural causes, as
some economists have argued, it would
scarcely have been necessary to go to such
lengths to ensure that its requirements be
observed" (1960, p. 281).
Haddock is also incorrect when he sug-
gests that sellers under BPP seem relatively
more homogeneous to buyers than a cartel
would wish (1990, p. 959). The fact of ho-
mogeneous output is exactly one reason why
the system is desired by the large firms
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located at the base point. The steel, cement,
and plywood firms that located at base
points wanted and took advantage of homo-
geneity via a spatial delivered price that
allowed them to maintain their markets over
substantial distances. Haddock ignores an
important aspect of many of these indus-
tries when he contends that a cartel would
prefer geographic market division. As
Wilcox (1960, p. 280) observed, changes in
the geographic pattern of demand for steel
(and presumably other construction mate-
rial) took place rapidly in the United States.
Thus, for these industries, producers' loca-
tions are fixed while consumers' are not.'
When subject to geographic market division
and f.o.b. pricing, firms would have to build
new facilities to follow demand. This is not
required as often under BPP since the large
powerful firms under BPP can readily sell in
new distant markets.^
II. Profits or Rents?
Haddock implies that cartelization must
fulfill its objectives (for example, joint profit
maximization, entry deterrence), or the car-
tel is ineffective. He refers to Ronald N.
Johnson and Allen M. Parkman's (1983)
demonstration that the cement industry did
not earn supranormal profits, proposing this
as evidence that any entry deterring efforts
by the firms in the industry had to be inef-
fective. It would then seem to follow that
any noncooperative, noncontrolled system
could also be ineffective with respect to
entry deterrence.^ However, long-run rents
'BGN assume immobile consumers as well, but
demonstrate that even in this case noncooperative pric-
ing is very unlikely and market segmentation is the
competitive result. In contrast. Haddock implies that
market segmentation is strictly a collusive outcome.
^This is another consideration that would reinforce
the TV (1988) conclusion that BPP becomes a relevant
collusive practice.
Haddock apparently accepts George J. Stigler's
(1971) theory of economic regulation since he suggests
that regulation and licensing may be a source of entry
limits. According to this view, most regulatory actions
provide cartel-like benefits for the regulated firms
rather than benefiting consumers. Stigler's theory is
based on the public choice paradigm in which bureau-
crats and other public officials are driven by self-inter-
est rather than public interest motives. Observe in this
in a true BPP system can appear in different
form than higher net profits, while also re-
sulting from entry deterring efforts. In par-
ticular, competition for prime locations
would bid up the value of these sites. These
locational rents would be capitalized as part
of land values, rather than appearing regu-
larly on P&L statements as high profits.
More fundamentally, cement industry prof-
its and individual firm profits are very dif-
ferent matters. This is especially the case
because the distant small firm locates dif-
ferently than a strictly competitive f.o.b. firm
while, at the same instant, earning less un-
der BPP than it otherwise would net (Melvin
L. Greenhut, 1956). Finally, note that for
risk-averse individuals, collusion that re-
duces the behavioral uncertainty inherent in
noncooperative oligopoly could easily make
the affected firms better off, even if nominal
profits do not increase in any measurable
way.
III. Conclusions: What in Fact Is Haddock's
Noncooperative Spatiai Pricing System?
Haddock's conclusions seem to agree with
BGN that a true basing-point system would
not exist under competitive conditions. Only
its refiection would arise, with distant firms
offering a modest discount."* He thus em-
phasizes what Burns (1936) called "near-
base-point pricing," NBPP. If this is what
Haddock means by competitive BPP, then
regard that the only examples of BPP which Haddock
now appears to consider to be valid come from Europe
"where the pricing structure is established and en-
forced through governmentally established bureaucra-
cies" (1990, fn. 5). While we do not agree with
Haddock that these are the only prime examples (for
example, the federal milk order system in the United
States has many basing-point characteristics), the fact
that the most obvious examples arise in governmentally
regulated settings reinforces the long-standing view
that nongovernmental^ imposed BPP is associated with
cooperative rather than competitive behavior.
"•A modest "discount" system could indeed prevail,
and in a crude sense it often does in retailing where an
uptown (suburban) department store and the uptown
branches of downtown stores charge higher prices than
the downtown price. Quite significantly, the differences
in price correspond roughly to the time-distance
"cost-saving" of suburban residents who shop at the
stores located nearest them rather than having to go
downtown.
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there really is little disagreement between
us except semantical. After all, competitive
price discrimination, which just undercuts
the base-point schedule, that is, NBPP, is
precisely the noncooperative price equilib-
rium that arises in the BGN extension (1990)
of the TV (1988) paper.
Competition in spatial markets, where
both immobile buyers and sellers are spa-
tially dispersed and transportation costs are
significant, as modeled by Haddock (1982)
and BGN (1990), leads naturally to a seg-
mented market structure under which spa-
tially separated firms, acting independent-
ly, would increase their profits by setting
prices that undercut the distant rivals,
ceteris paribus. It has, indeed, been well es-
tablished in the literature on spatial price
theory that freight-absorbing discriminatory
pricing over a geographic space, as depicted
by TV (1988) and BGN (1990), is the natu-
ral pricing form for noncooperative firms.^
Certainly, demand elasticities can be ex-
pected on a priori grounds to differ at each
buying site within a submarket (Edgar M.
Hoover, 1936-37; Arthur F. Smithies, 1941;
Greenhut, 1956). Note further that even the
traditional view of f.o.b. pricing as a com-
petitive process comes into question when
invasion of another firm's submarket
through price discrimination is considered
(Greenhut, Norman, and Chao-shun Hung,
1987; Benson and Greenhut, 1989). Com-
petitive spatial price discrimination en-
hances consumer welfare relative to a
basing-point system, which welfare conse-
quence is a rather clear theoretical predic-
tion, not the unpredictable empirical issue
suggested by Haddock.* Furthermore, BPP
For empirical evidence of this pricing in the United
States, West Germany and Japan, see Greenhut (1981).
' indeed, we find Haddock's discussion of welfare
implications somewhat mystifying since the welfare
benefits he discusses arise under NBPP (which is a
form of spatial price discrimination) and BGN never
suggested that such gains would be "modest." We are
also surprised that Haddock turns to Austrian argu-
ments to defend his position on competitive BPP that
was originally based on a very non-Austrian static
equilibrium model. Of course, producer surpluses are
relevant, but the gains in consumer surplus from the
breakdown of a basing-point system do not arise solely
is a hybrid price system characterized by
freight absorption and phantom freight, as
all firms at sites other than the base point
are obliged to price discriminate while those
located at the base point price f.o.b. mill.
When a true basing-point pricing system
arises, it is likely to have been imposed as a
result of a cooperative process (Machlup,
1940; Stigler, 1949) under which the distant
sellers feel obliged (coerced) to follow the
established system (Greenhut, 1956; Wilcox,
1960). As such, it provides strong corrobora-
tive evidence of cooperative pricing, particu-
larly when accompanied by organized en-
forcement efi^ orts and punishment of those
who cut price in violation of rate books, and
so on. When Haddock's ^wajr-base-point
price system arises, it is in the form of
discounts offered to buyers located most
proximate to a distant seller.
Two final issues warrant mention. (1)
Haddock's statement (1990, p. 957) that "It
seems peculiar to try to settle an essentially
empirical issue through pure theory,..."
(emphasis added) reveals a failure to appre-
ciate the place of theory in understanding
the world we live in. Specifically, what is the
empirical issue? Surely not the issue of ri-
valrous versus collusive behavior. That issue
is a purely theoretical one that can be re-
solved only through careful consideration of
the theory of pricing behavior. A theoretical
model explains the circumstances under
which a firm will price f.o.b. or follow BPP.
Then, and only then, does the empirical
determination of the form of pricing, its
circumstances and extent become relevant.
(2) Based on theory, the reason for a distant
firm's adherence to BPP requires just one
restrictive condition: fear of the impacts that
would follow from competitive pricing. On
the other hand, the reasons why firms at the
production center use BPP to protect rents
rather than what otherwise would appear to
be more profitable systems are the homo-
geneity/near homogeneity of their goods.
from a surplus transfer: the non-base point firm is also
better off. Surely Haddock is not suggesting that BPP is
acceptable because the base-point firms are better off
even though consumers and distant firms lose out?
VOL. 80 NO. 4 BENSON ETAL: THE BASING POINT SYSTEM 967
the simplicity of BPP, and the low costs in
implementing, monitoring, and enforcing
the system.
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